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Abstract 
 
In the State of Capture report the public protector instructed the 
president to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the 
capture of state institutions by the Gupta family. The president 
and his family are personally implicated and due to a conflict of 
interests, the public protector limited both his choice of a 
commissioner to conduct the inquiry and the power to specify 
certain terms of reference. In the Economic Freedom Fighters, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that the public protector's remedial 
action is legally binding and must be executed by the state 
organs concerned. President Zuma challenges the remedial 
action on the basis that it is the sole prerogative of the head of 
state under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) to appoint commissions of 
inquiry and that it is an unfettered discretionary power, which 
may not be limited. It is not only doubtful whether the 
responsibility to appoint commissions of inquiry is invariably a 
discretionary power; it is also doubtful whether the president has 
an unfettered discretion. In the case of a conflict of interest the 
president would in any event be barred from taking a decision in 
terms of the nemo iudex maxim if the decision could be tainted 
by bias. The difficulty is that section 90 of the Constitution does 
not regulate the ad hoc exercise of section 84(2) powers by 
another state organ when the president should recuse himself 
from taking a decision. The limitations imposed by the public 
protector in regard to the commission of inquiry appear to be the 
best solution under the circumstances. 
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1 Introductory comments 
President Zuma has challenged the validity of the remedial action that the 
former Public Protector, Advocate Madonsela, prescribed in her State of 
Capture report. The key issue is how to reconcile the powers of the public 
protector to take remedial action under section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) with the powers of 
the respective state organs that should execute the remedial action, in casu, 
the appointment of a commission of inquiry into the alleged capture of state 
institutions by the Gupta family. A second aspect is how best to avoid biased 
decisions by the president, since he is personally implicated. In terms of the 
nemo iudex maxim, a state official must recuse himself from taking 
decisions when a conflict of interest arises. The difficulty is that section 90 
of the Constitution provides for other state organs to take over functions of 
the president as head of state only in an acting capacity and for a specified 
period, not on an ad hoc basis. 
2 The State of Capture report in a nutshell 
Allegations of corruption, irregularity and personal enrichment are 
widespread and run deep: that is the over-riding message contained in the 
350-plus pages of the State of Capture report. The report documents the 
involvement of the Gupta family in the appointment and dismissal of 
ministers and directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulting in the 
improper and corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta 
family's business empire. Members of cabinet, a former cabinet minister and 
other persons testified that the Gupta family offered bribes and/or posts in 
exchange for certain benefits. The president and/or his family members 
were either present or facilitated the meetings. The evidence presented by 
the public protector is too extensive to set out all the details here.1 
                                            
* Loammi Wolf. LLB (1981 UFS); LLM (1985 University of Virginia, USA); LLD (1988 
Unisa); Diploma in German Taxation Law and Chartered Accountancy (1991 Frankfurt, 
Germany). The author runs the initiative Democracy for Peace and is a research fellow 
of the UFS Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State. E-mail address: 
loammi@arcor.de 
1  Public Protector 2016 http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/2016-
17/State_Capture_14October2016.pdf (State of Capture Report) 14-23, 45-283. The 
report referred to several instances where the Guptas tried to influence cabinet 
appointments or dismissals, inter alia that of former finance minister Nene, former 
deputy finance minister Jonas, and former public enterprises minister Hogan. Ms 
Mentor testified that the Guptas offered her Hogan's position in exchange for favours. 
The report chronicles how Molefe, a Gupta protégée, was first appointed as a CEO of 
Transnet and then moved to Eskom as CEO to do their bidding. He and the mineral 
resources minister, Zwane, exerted pressure to force Glencore Plc to sell its Optimum 
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It appears that the State of Capture report was initially intended to be 
released as a preliminary report or as a report on the first phase of the 
investigation.2 Two factors played a role in Madonsela's taking the decision 
to declare the report final and to sign it off on 14 October 2016.3 First, she 
had a specific time frame in which to report: the Executive Members' Ethics 
Act 82 of 1998 obliges her to investigate any alleged breach of the Executive 
Ethics Code and thereafter, within 30 days, to submit a report to either the 
President or the Premier, depending on the nature of the complaint.4 
Secondly, Advocate Mkhwebane, the incoming public protector, had made 
public announcements about why she thought that the state capture probe 
could not be a priority once she was in office.5 
It appears that the legal advisors of the public protector thought that if she 
only presented findings, it would be difficult to take the report on review.6 
What was being produced was prima facie evidence of wrongdoing, and to 
review on that basis would be difficult. Due to time constraints, a lack of 
funds, and the legal manoeuvres of some of the implicated parties, including 
President Zuma, section 7(9) of the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 could 
not be complied with.7 This section allows those against whom adverse 
findings will be made the opportunity to respond to all the allegations. It also 
allows an implicated person or his or her legal representative, through the 
public protector, to question other witnesses, as determined by the public 
                                            
Coal operation to a company controlled by the Gupta family and the president's son 
Duduzane Zuma. The former deputy minister of finance, Jonas, testified that the 
Guptas offered him the post of finance minister and a bribe of R600 million provided 
that he would be co-operative and help them to attain their goal of increasing the 
amount of money they made from the state from R6 billion to R8 billion. He was 
expected to remove the director-general of the National Treasury and other key 
members of Executive Management. 
2  Marumoagae 2014 De Rebus 32 points out that there is no provision in the Public 
Protector Act 23 of 1994 that regulates the publication of preliminary findings. 
3  Gallens 2016 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/madonsela-weighs-her-
options-over-state-capture-report-interdict-20161013. 
4  Section 3(2) of the Executive Members' Ethics Act 82 of 1998. 
5  Tmg Digital 2016 http://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2016/10/06/new-public-protector-
reveal-thulis-state-capture-probe-cant-priority. After she took office the investigation 
grinded to a halt, and even after the #GuptaLeaks event revealed the massive scale 
of wrongdoing, she did not pursue the matter with much enthusiasm. 
6  Vollgraaff et al 2016 http://www.fin24.com/Economy/madonselas-regret-i-shouldve-
been-harder-on-zuma-20161102-2. 
7  Rabkin 2016 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2016-10-26-state-capture-
report-done-fairly. President Zuma claimed that he had not been given enough time 
to respond to the allegations and maintained he had been told he was implicated only 
on October 2, 2016. It has been meticulously documented that Zuma was in fact 
offered an opportunity to make representations several times from March 2016. He 
failed to respond to 42 questions posed by Madonsela that also involved his son 
Duduzane and used delaying tactics not to give evidence. 
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protector.8 If adverse findings therefore had been made against anyone 
without complying with section 7(9), a court may have been persuaded to 
review and set aside the report on the basis that the public protector had 
not complied with her legal duties in compiling the report. The fact that the 
report does not make findings against any implicated person may therefore 
make it more difficult to persuade a court that the report should be reviewed 
and set aside.9 Madonsela admitted that the task to investigate the 
allegations of state capture was so huge that she could only scratch the 
surface. 
On the eve of Madonsela's releasing the report, President Zuma applied for 
an urgent interdict to prevent the publication of the report. He wanted the 
investigation to be completed by Madonsela's successor, apparently in the 
hope that she would be less rigorous or might not pursue the probe any 
further.10 However, during the hearing he withdrew the application. On 
November 2, 2016 the Pretoria High Court ordered the release of the 
report.11 
A second report, published by academics in May 2017, documents how a 
Zuma-centred power-elite has managed to capture key state institutions to 
repurpose them in subverting the constitutional and legal framework. The 
report refers to it as a "silent coup" that created a mafia-like shadow state.12 
Corruption normally refers to a condition where public officials pursue 
private ends using public means. While corruption in the executive and 
public administration is wide-spread, state capture is a far greater systemic 
threat. 
Hard on the heels of this report, an anonymous whistle-blower leaked 
between 100,000 and 200,000 emails from the Gupta network. The 
#GuptaLeaks indicate that the public protector's report revealed only the tip 
of the state capture iceberg. The emails show that the Gupta influence on 
                                            
8  The State of Capture Report 13 lists the names of the persons to whom notices in 
terms of s 7(9) of the Public Protector Act were issued, inter alia Zuma, the Gupta 
brothers, and ministers Brown, van Rooyen and Zwane. All these notices were 
dispatched in October 2016. 
9  De Vos 2016 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-11-03-can-zuma-use-
the-law-to-avoid-the-consequences-of-madonselas-report/#.WVHwPOlpzyQ. 
10  Lowman 2016 http://www.biznews.com/leadership/2016/10/13/zumas-last-ditch-
effort-to-silence-madonsela-on-state-capture. 
11  Evans 2016 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-withdrawal-catches-
public-protectors-office-by-surprise-20161102; Nicolaides and Bateman 2016 
http://ewn.co.za/2016/11/02/public-protector-ordered-to-release-state-capture-report-
by-5pm-today. 
12  Swilling et al 2017 http://markswilling.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/25052017-
Betrayal-of-the-Promise.pdf. 
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cabinet and other appointments is far more extensive and has been 
operative since May 2009, ie from the beginning of the first Zuma 
presidency. The Guptas boasted that they had made Zuma's son Duduzane 
a billionaire. They had also bought Zuma a R331 million mansion and 
helped his son to buy an R18 million luxury apartment in Dubai. The 
kickbacks they have received from state contracts run into billions of 
rands.13 
3 The remedial action 
The remedial action essentially entails that the public protector instructed 
the president to appoint, within 30 days, a commission of inquiry into "state 
capture". The public protector noted that the president has the power to 
appoint a commission of inquiry under section 84(2) of the Constitution. 
However, in the matter of the Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of 
Parliament, which concerned irregularities in the upgrades of the private 
residence of the president at Nkandla, he said that: "I could not have carried 
out the evaluation myself lest I be accused of being judge and jury in my 
own case". 
Since the president is implicated in the state capture inquiry, Madonsela 
instructed that the chief justice should provide one name of a judge to the 
president to head the commission. The commission should be adequately 
funded by the treasury and be given powers of evidence collection that are 
no less than that of the public protector. The commission should complete 
its inquiry within 180 days and present the president with findings and 
recommendations. The president should submit a copy to parliament within 
14 days of its release and inform parliament about his intentions regarding 
the implementation of the recommendations. The second aspect of the 
remedial action entails that parliament should review, within 180 days, the 
Executive Members' Ethics Act 82 of 1998 to provide better guidance 
regarding integrity, including the avoidance and management of conflict of 
interest. Finally, it was recommended that the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA) should investigate and prosecute possible breaches of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 and the 
Public Finances Act 44 of 1998.14 
                                            
13  Most information is available on the amaBhungane databank under "#GuptaLeaks: all 
the latest on the Gupta-Zuma scandal" (amaBhungane Reporter 2016 
http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2016-09-23-two-to-tango-the-story-of-zuma-and-
the-guptas). 
14  State of Capture Report 24-26, 353-354. 
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In her report Madonsela stated that she had decided to direct that a judicial 
commission be set up to probe Zuma's relationship with the Guptas because 
the scope of the investigation was too extensive and had been hamstrung 
by an insufficiency of funds. At the outset of the investigation she had 
requested resources for a special investigation similar to a commission of 
inquiry overseen by the public protector. The justice department had made 
the funds available only in September and the allocated R1.5 million was 
completely insufficient.15 The funds seem meagre indeed, compared to the 
R40 million, subsequently increased to R137 million, which the department 
of justice made available to the Seriti commission to conduct an inquiry of a 
similar scale.16 
The president was faced with the option of either complying with the 
remedial action within 30 days or challenging it. He opted for taking the 
remedial action on judicial review and launched an action in the Pretoria 
High Court to set the remedial action aside. He reportedly argues that the 
remedial action is unconstitutional and that the matter should be sent back 
to the new public protector for further investigation.17 
The question is whether the president launched the action in the right 
jurisdiction. In a press statement issued by the presidency on 26 May 2017, 
he stated that the review challenge is aimed at clarifying and strengthening 
constitutional jurisprudence "on the roles of the Executive, the Judiciary and 
Chapter 9 institutions".18 The challenge therefore clearly entails a dispute 
about the demarcation of the powers of state organs, more specifically the 
head of state and the public protector, which falls in the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Constitutional Court.19 
4 The nature and scope of remedial action under section 
182(1)(c) 
                                            
15  State of Capture Report 353. 
16  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 
http://www.justice.gov.za/m_statements/2013/20130822-comms-funding.html; Heard 
2016 http://city-press.news24.com/News/the-r137m-price-tag-for-whitewash-arms-
deal-report-20160524. 
17  Quintal 2016 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2016-11-25-zuma-to-take-
madonselas-state-capture-report-to-court. 
18  Presidency 2017 http://www.psppd.org.za/press-statements/president-zuma-not-
opposed-establishing-commission-inquiry-%E2%80%9Cstate-capture%E2%80%9D. 
19  Section 167(4)(a) of the Constitution. The offices of the head of state and the public 
protector both fall within the scope of the definition of "state organs" in terms of s 239 
para (b)(i) of the Constitution. 
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The Chapter 9 institutions were created to strengthen democracy and 
accountability. They are independent but accountable to the National 
Assembly.20 On the one hand, the institutions therefore have to act as 
watchdogs, holding state organs (including legislative and executive bodies) 
accountable, and on the other, they are accountable to the Assembly.21 To 
ensure their independence, the institutions must be sufficiently funded. 
Corder et al noted that some Chapter 9 institutions must be seen as 
complementary to Parliament's own oversight functions. They aid and 
support Parliament by providing it with information. With the complex nature 
of modern government, members of parliament often do not have the time 
and resources to investigate in depth, or because of party discipline do not 
have the political independence that is required to arrive at an impartial 
decision on a complaint. Hence, state institutions supporting constitutional 
democracy have been created to assist Parliament in its traditional 
functions.22 This is certainly true for the office of the public protector. 
The public protector has been vested with constitutional powers to 
investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any 
sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to 
result in any impropriety or prejudice.23 The public protector may not 
investigate court decisions.24 Implicit in that is that criminal investigations 
and prosecutions by the National Prosecuting Authority are sub judice and 
may also not be investigated. They fall in the exclusive competence of the 
prosecuting authority as part of the administration of justice.25 There had 
been difficulties in the past where a public protector exceeded the scope of 
his powers in this regard.26 
                                            
20  Section 181(2) and (5) of the Constitution. 
21  De Vos "Role of Chapter 9 Institutions" 163. 
22  Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau 1999 http://www.casac.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Report-on-Parliamentary-Oversight-and-Accountability.pdf 
para 7.1.2. 
23  Section 182(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
24  Section 182(3) of the Constitution. 
25  Section 179(2) and (4) of the Constitution.  
26  Public Protector 2005 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/public_ 
protector_0405.pdf (Mushwana Report) 31-34. Deputy President Zuma laid a 
complaint with the public protector in connection with a criminal investigation 
conducted against him relating to allegations of corruption in the arms deal in May 
2004. The erstwhile public protector, Mushwana, found that the NPA had violated 
Zuma's rights to human dignity. The NPA objected in no unclear terms to the report, 
since the investigation of a sub judice matter did not fall within the scope of powers of 
the public prosecutor. See Monare 2006 http://www.iol.co.za 
/news/south-africa/npa-questions-mushwanas-ambit-on-zuma-report-291587. 
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There are no explicit limits to the kind of remedial action that could be 
ordered except that it must be "appropriate". As set out above, the remedial 
action of the public protector in the State of Capture report involved 
instructions to three different state organs: the president was tasked with 
appointing a judicial commission of inquiry, the Assembly with reviewing the 
Executive Members' Ethics Act to provide better guidance regarding 
integrity, including the avoidance and management of conflicts of interest, 
and the prosecuting authority with investigating and prosecuting possible 
breaches of criminal law. This does not imply that the public prosecutor is 
usurping their powers, because they must still take the remedial action by 
themselves. 
In Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) v Speaker of the National Assembly, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that section 182(1)(c) spells out that the public 
protector's power "to take appropriate remedial action" is legally binding and 
not merely a recommendation that can be ignored, nilly willy.27 In the Secure 
in Comfort report the public protector instructed President Zuma to pay back 
a reasonable portion of the non-security upgrades to his private residence 
in rural KwaZulu-Natal, which instruction with the approval of the National 
Assembly, he did not comply with.28 The Constitutional Court did not mince 
its words about that:29 
Complaints are lodged with the Public Protector to cure incidents of 
impropriety, prejudice, unlawful enrichment or corruption in government 
circles. This is done not only to observe the constitutional values and 
principles necessary to ensure that the 'efficient, economic and effective use 
of resources [is] promoted', that accountability finds expression, but also that 
high standards of professional ethics are promoted and maintained. To 
achieve this requires a difference-making and responsive remedial action. 
Besides, one cannot really talk about remedial action unless a remedy in the 
true sense is provided to address a complaint in a meaningful way. 
The court held that the National Assembly had a constitutional duty to 
scrutinize the president's conduct reported to it by the public protector, and 
was duty-bound to hold the president accountable in terms of section 55 by 
facilitating and ensuring compliance with the decision of the public 
protector.30 Although the National Assembly was permitted to scrutinize the 
report of the public protector to determine the correctness of the report with 
                                            
27  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance 
v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 3 SA 580 (CC) (hereafter EFF v Speaker) 
paras 50-52, 65, 72–79. 
28  Secure in Comfort Report paras 10.10.1.5–6. 
29  EFF v Speaker para 65 (emphasis supplied). 
30  EFF v Speaker para 97. 
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a view to having the report reviewed by a court,31 it was not permitted to 
substitute the report with its own findings.32 
The Court made clear that remedial action ordered by the public protector 
has to be executed by the relevant state organs in terms of the constitutional 
powers allocated to them. This implies that the public protector's powers 
under section 182 of the Constitution must be interpreted in a way that would 
harmonise her powers with the powers of other state organs. In Matatiele 
the Constitutional Court emphasised that the provisions of the Constitution 
must be construed purposively and should not be interpreted in isolation.33 
One can therefore make a strong case that just as the Assembly was 
obliged to hold the president accountable in terms of the powers under 
section 55 of the Constitution, the prosecuting authority should be notified 
when in the opinion of the public protector the facts of an investigation 
disclose the commission of an offence. In fact, the Public Protector Act 
obliges the public protector to do so.34 Despite criminal charges having been 
laid, not much has come of these "state capture" investigations. This is 
partly due to the de facto executive control of the prosecuting authority, and 
partly to the unclarified constitutional status of the prosecuting authority in 
relation to its functional and structural independence from the executive.35 
                                            
31  EFF v Speaker paras 85–87. 
32  In EFF v Speaker paras 98–99 the court held: "[T]here was everything wrong with the 
National Assembly stepping into the shoes of the Public Protector, by passing a 
resolution that purported effectively to nullify the findings made and remedial action 
taken by the Public Protector and replacing them with its own findings and 'remedial 
action'. This, the rule of law is dead against. It is another way of taking the law into 
one's hands and thus constitutes self-help … By passing that resolution the National 
Assembly effectively flouted its obligations. Neither the President nor the National 
Assembly was entitled to respond to the binding remedial action taken by the Public 
Protector as if it is of no force or effect or has been set aside through a proper judicial 
process. The ineluctable conclusion is therefore that the National Assembly's 
resolution based on the minister's findings exonerating the President from liability is 
inconsistent with the Constitution and unlawful." (Emphasis supplied.) 
33  In Matatiele Municipality v President of the RSA 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) para 36, Ngcobo 
J quoted a judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 1, 14) and 
held that: "Our Constitution embodies the basic and fundamental objectives of our 
constitutional democracy. Like the German Constitution, it "has an inner unity, and the 
meaning of any one part is linked to that of other provisions. Taken as a unit [our] 
Constitution reflects certain overarching principles and fundamental decisions to 
which individual provisions are subordinate". Individual provisions of the Constitution 
cannot therefore be considered and construed in isolation. Constitutional provisions 
must be construed purposively and in the light of the Constitution as a whole". 
34  Section 6(4)(c)(i) of the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. 
35  The difficulties currently being experienced in containing corruption in the public 
administration can be attributed to the dissolution of the prosecuting authority's own 
independent forensic unit (the "Scorpions") and to the fact that the executive subjects 
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Similarly, one can argue that when the public protector notices that a 
particular investigation is too extensive and would need substantial funding, 
she could require that the head of state should appoint a commission with 
sufficient funding to conduct an in-depth inquiry. In terms of the powers 
conferred upon the public protector under section 6(4)(c)(ii) of the Public 
Protector Act, Madonsela had the competence, at any time prior to, during 
or after the investigation, if she deemed it advisable to do so, to refer the 
matter to an appropriate public body to make an appropriate 
recommendation regarding the redress of the prejudice resulting therefrom 
or to make any other appropriate recommendation he or she deemed 
expedient. A judicial commission of inquiry into executive malfeasance 
would be an appropriate public body in casu. It therefore seems that 
Madonsela acted within the limits of her constitutional and statutory powers. 
It is not for the president to determine what remedial action is or is not 
appropriate. 
There have been difficulties in the past in ensuring the independence of 
Chapter 9 institutions insofar as they should be sufficiently funded.36 One 
difficulty is that their budgets are not allocated by Parliament or directly by 
the treasury but by government departments.37 The justice department 
handles the budget of the public protector, and as we have seen in the case 
of the "state capture" investigation, the extra funding that was requested 
was allocated only after a long delay and was completely insufficient. This 
certainly hampered the capacity of the public protector to conduct the 
investigation as extensively as she would have liked to within the available 
timeframe. 
Dube rightly argues that given the time frames and sheer volume of the 
investigations to be conducted, there has been insufficient time to make 
                                            
prosecutors to undue control. The executive cannot give orders to prosecutors – 
neither in a Westminster system, nor in a constitutional state. In the Westminster 
system, prosecutors are functionally independent from the executive and cabinet 
ministers must abide by the doctrine of independent aloofness. In a constitutional 
state, prosecutors are both functionally and structurally independent from the 
executive. See Wolf 2015 Administratio Publica 32-35. The nature of their powers is 
not executive and they are not constitutionally mandated to take administrative action. 
That falls in the exclusive domain of the executive (s 85(2)(a) of the Constitution). 
Prosecutors enforce criminal law, and that falls in the domain of the administration of 
justice. See Wolf 2011 TSAR 703-729. Thus, they are grouped together with the 
judiciary as a second organ in the third branch of state power (the judicature), which 
is responsible for the administration of justice under Chapter 8 of the Constitution. See 
Wolf 2015 Administratio Publica 36-49. The status of the prosecuting authority and 
nature of its powers are in urgent need of clarification by the Constitutional Court. 
36  Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 9 BCLR 883 (CC). 
37  De Vos "Role of Chapter 9 Institutions" 166-168. 
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binding remedial findings which would have withstood the scrutiny of the 
courts. The State of Capture report therefore does not make specific 
findings but rather recommends the appointment of a commission of inquiry 
that is properly funded. The commission of inquiry would then be a judicial 
fact-finding mission of a very high level of competency, based on the State 
of Capture report's prima facie assessments. Given further the 
circumstances in which the State of Capture report was compiled, there is 
a need for the commission of inquiry to bring to finality the investigations 
conducted by the erstwhile public protector. It is well known that her term of 
office ended on 14 October 2016 and that she was bound by the time-frame 
of the Executive Members' Ethics Act.38 In the light of the Constitutional 
Court's views on the public protector's powers, the President would probably 
have to show why, given the State of Capture report, it is not rational to 
appoint a commission of inquiry. 
There are certainly implicit constitutional limits to the kind of remedial action 
that can be ordered. The remedial action directed at the National Assembly 
in the State of Capture report, compared to the remedial action ordered by 
Madonsela's successor in the Bankorp matter, illustrates the point. 
Madonsela noted shortcomings in the Executive Members' Ethics Act, 
which made it difficult for the public protector to exercise her powers, and 
requested a review of the Act to provide better guidance regarding integrity, 
including the avoidance and management of conflict of interests. This falls 
within the constitutional scope of the powers of Chapter 9 institutions, 
insofar as section 181(3) of the Constitution obliges other state organs to 
assist them "through legislative and other measures" to ensure the 
impartiality and effectiveness of the exercise of their functions. Madonsela 
was careful not to instruct Parliament to amend the Act. 
Mkhwebane, however, told the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Correctional Services of the National Assembly that he or she 
"must initiate a process that will result in the amendment of section 224 of 
the Constitution".39 In other words, she invoked remedial powers of the 
public protector to enforce a constitutional amendment of the powers of the 
Reserve Bank.40 The primary task of the latter is to manage currency 
                                            
38  Dube 2016 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/did-the-state-of-capture-
report-usurp-the-presiden. 
39  Para 7.2.1. of the Bankorp Report (Public Protector 2017 http://www.pprotect.org/ 
library/investigation_report/2016-
17/Report%208%20of%202017&2018%20Public%20Protector%20South%20Africa.
pdf. 
40  Sections 224(1) and 225 of the Constitution. 
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stability in the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth and to 
function as a lender of last resort, which task she ordered to be amended 
so that the Reserve Bank would be a state bank that nationalises the 
currency to create money. The audacity of the remedial action leaves one 
speechless. It reflects a gross misconception of the powers of the public 
protector. A constitutional amendment is a very serious matter and must be 
well considered. The Constitution has therefore conferred the sole 
prerogative to amend the Constitution upon the National Assembly, and the 
latter must adhere to the extraordinary procedures prescribed by section 74. 
It does not fall within the scope of the Chapter 9 institutions to order a 
constitutional amendment: they are "subject to the Constitution and the 
law".41 Mkhwebane therefore has to operate within the framework of the 
Constitution as it is.42 There are other disturbing aspects of the remedial 
action she ordered, which reveals a serious lack of understanding of the 
law.43 It certainly makes her fitness for the office questionable. 
5 The responsibility for appointing commissions 
Two issues are relevant in the context of the president's challenge of the 
remedial action: the first is whether the responsibility of the head of state to 
appoint commissions of inquiry is invariably a discretionary power, and 
                                            
41  Section 181(2) of the Constitution. 
42  De Vos 2016 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-11-03-can-zuma-use-
the-law-to-avoid-the-consequences-of-madonselas-report/#.WVHwPOlpzyQ. 
43  She ordered the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) to approach President Zuma to 
reopen the recovery of interest, following the financial assistance of the Reserve Bank 
to the banking group Bankorp over the period 1985 to 1995 as recommended by the 
CIEX report (1997). In 2000 a panel of experts lead by Judge Dennis Davis found that 
the Reserve Bank acted ultra vires, but that it was not feasible to pursue the matter 
due to difficulties pertaining to the quantification of the alleged enrichment of the legal 
successors of the Bankorp group and the identity of the beneficiaries. The Mbeki 
government followed the panel's advice. The complaint about the government's failure 
to implement the recommendations of the CIEX report was lodged only in 2010. In 
terms of s 6(9) of the Public Protector Act, the public protector was barred from 
investigating the compliant, since it was not reported within two years. Any claims to 
recover the debt have also prescribed, which makes the remedial action even more 
irrational. 
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second, whether the power is an unfettered discretion. Other aspects of the 
challenge will also be discussed briefly. 
5.1 The challenge of the president 
Reportedly, the president is challenging the remedial action on the basis 
that it violates the rule of law, is inconsistent with the Constitution and 
"breaches the separation of powers principle". He argues:44 
What is at stake is the interpretation of the Constitution on a matter as 
fundamental as the powers of the Head of State and Government and the 
relationship of the executive branch with other branches. 
The president appears to be under the impression that the section 84(2) 
responsibilities are executive powers. These powers, however, are sui 
generis and should be distinguished from powers of the executive branch 
under section 85.45 The separation of powers refers specifically to the three 
branches of state power (trias politica), viz the legislature, the executive and 
the administration of justice.46 Therefore a dispute about the demarcation of 
the powers of the head of state and the public protector has nothing to do 
with the separation of powers. 
The president further argues that the power to appoint commissions of 
inquiry is an unfettered discretionary power of the head of state and that the 
public protector may not issue instructions to appoint such an inquiry. 
5.2 The nature and scope of the power to appoint commissions of 
inquiry 
Before the nature and scope of the power to appoint commissions of inquiry 
are considered, a brief discussion of the origins of the power is appropriate 
in order to highlight the ambivalent nature of the power as it evolved. 
5.2.1 The origins of the prerogatives and their transition 
The prerogative powers, including the power to appoint commissions of 
inquiry, were received as constitutional common law on the basis of British 
law in the Union of South Africa in 1910. In later South African constitutions, 
only the prerogatives that were explicitly listed formed part of the powers of 
                                            
44  Presidency 2017 http://www.psppd.org.za/press-statements/president-zuma-not-
opposed-establishing-commission-inquiry-%E2%80%9Cstate-capture%E2%80%9D. 
45  President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
(SARFU) 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 144 (hereafter President v SARFU). 
46  De Vos and Freedman South African Constitutional Law 102; Rautenbach and 
Malherbe Constitutional Law 84. 
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the head of state.47 The convention that the prerogatives should be 
exercised on the advice of another state organ was retained. The rationale 
behind the convention was to serve as a curb on the exercise of these 
powers.48 
In the United Kingdom the royal prerogatives are residual powers of the 
former feudal or absolutist monarchs that cut across the whole spectrum of 
state power.49 The appointment of royal commissions of inquiry falls under 
the political prerogatives, more specifically the executive prerogatives, and 
is exercised on the advice of the prime minister or the cabinet.50 Royal 
commissions of inquiry serve the purpose of advising the government on 
public policy issues with a view to drafting or amending legislation. When 
the commission has delivered its report, it is for the minister or the 
government to decide how far its recommendations are acceptable, and if 
so, in what form they should be carried out, for example by the preparing of 
a bill to amend the law. For all practical purposes, the executive appoints 
commissions of inquiry in the UK, because the prerogative power must be 
exercised on the advice of the prime minister. Royal commissions of inquiry 
must be distinguished from inquiries appointed by ministers under the 
Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1921.51 Unlike these inquiries, royal 
commissions of inquiry do not have the power to compel the attendance of 
witnesses.52 
Initially, the prerogative to appoint commissions of inquiry in South Africa 
was also restricted to public policy matters, but the Commissions Act 8 of 
1947, which is still in force, extended the scope of such inquiries to "matters 
of public concern" and conferred the powers to subpoena witnesses and 
                                            
47  Section 7(3) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961 (hereafter the 
1961 Constitution).  
48  Carpenter Constitutional Law 174-175; Wiechers Staatsreg 59-67. 
49  A distinction is drawn between prerogatives that are personal, ecclesiastical, political 
(ie executive and legislative), "acts of state" (foreign affairs) or relating to the 
dispensing of justice. Depending on the case, a prerogative has to be exercised on 
the advice of the prime minister, the Lord Chancellor or the secretary of home affairs. 
See Bradley and Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law 246-258, 306; Finer 
Governments 124; House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 2004 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/ 
cmselect/cmpubadm/422/422.pdf (House of Commons Taming the Prerogative) 5-8; 
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 2005 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmpubadm/51/51i.pdf 
(House of Commons Government by Inquiry). 
50  Bradley and Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law 246-258, 306. 
51  The Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1921 was repealed and replaced with the 
Inquiries Act in 2005. 
52  Bradley and Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law 306; Gossnell 1934 Polit Sci 
Q 84-118. 
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take evidence under oath like those of the erstwhile Supreme Court on 
commissioners. Inquiries into matters of public policy were usually chaired 
by experts in a specific field. Matters of "public concern", by contrast, were 
extended to include executive malfeasance and an abuse of power. 
Because of the subpoena powers and the extended scope of potential 
investigations, a practice soon developed that judges were appointed to 
chair such inquiries. 
The difficulty is that unlike the British Act, which has cast the latter type of 
inquiry in the form of a self-control mechanism for the executive, the South 
African Act conferred this power also upon the head of state.53 In terms of 
common law, however, prerogatives are usually curbed by legislation, not 
extended. The 1961 Constitution also explicitly stipulated that the state 
president possessed the same powers and functions as the Queen had 
possessed by virtue of her prerogative immediately prior to the 
commencement of the Constitution.54 In the UK, the appointment of inquiries 
into matters of public interest (or concern) was not part of the prerogative 
power. Strangely, it appears that the Commissions Act in fact intended to 
expand the original prerogative power since it refers explicitly to 
commissions appointed under the prerogative power before the Act 
commenced.55 It was not necessarily "unconstitutional" that parliament 
conferred the power on the state president to appoint such inquiries into 
executive malfeasance, because the head of state was also a part of 
parliament under the Westminster constitutions. Such inquiries could be 
legitimised with the oversight functions of parliament.56 
The fusion of the offices of head and state and head of government in 1984 
implied that the state president, who could appoint commissions of inquiry 
                                            
53  The British parliament largely gave up its powers to conduct inquiries when the 1921 
Act was adopted. In 2005 the House of Commons conducted an extensive inquiry 
about commissions of inquiry and found that ministerial commissions of inquiry have 
often been used for "kicking an issue into the long grass, blaming predecessors in 
government, making a gesture or simply buckling to public pressure to do something". 
Executive control of such inquiries had led in effect to the diminishing of the role of 
parliament to hold the executive accountable since the 1970s. See House of 
Commons Government by Inquiry 9, 12, 60–69. 
54  Section 7(4) of the 1961 Constitution. Section 7(3) listed all former prerogative powers 
that were conferred upon the head of state. 
55  Section 1 of the Commissions Act 8 of 1947 (hereafter the Commissions Act) 
determines: "Whenever the Governor-General has, before or after the 
commencement of this Act, appointed a commission … for the purpose of investigating 
a matter of public concern, he may by proclamation in the Gazette declare the 
provisions of this Act …. to be applicable…" (emphasis added). 
56  On the nature of the office of the state president under the 1961 Constitution, see 
Wiechers Staatsreg 227–228. 
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as head of state, was required do so on his own advice (as the head of 
government). The curb on the power thus fell away, yet nobody raised any 
concerns about that. A fair number of constitutional law experts queried the 
retention of the prerogatives in a republican state when the 1983 
Constitution was adopted,57 but it was scarcely discussed when the 1993 
and 1996 Constitutions were drafted.58 Royal prerogatives, however, are an 
inherent part of a constitutional monarchy and constitute residual powers of 
a monarch not yet wrested from the Crown. 
The drafters of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions therefore ought to have 
considered whether some of these residual powers of a constitutional 
monarch, which had been retained in the 1961 and 1983 Constitutions, 
should not be allocated to other state organs that are responsible to perform 
such functions in terms of a modern separation of powers. There are several 
powers listed in section 84(2) of the 1996 Constitution that can and should 
be exercised by the head of state in a republican constitutional state. 
However, both the pardoning power (the former judicial royal prerogative to 
veto court sentences) and the power to appoint commissions of inquiry are 
problematic for various reasons.59 The power to appoint commissions of 
inquiry into policy matters for the purposes of drafting concept legislation 
actually falls in the domain of the executive and the legislature, not the head 
of state.60 The head of state is no longer a part of parliament, as he was 
under the Westminster constitutions, to justify such a power.61 
Thus far the Constitutional Court has not declared judicial commissions of 
inquiry into matters of public concern to be incompatible with judicial 
functions. In South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v 
Heath,62 the Constitutional Court indicated that "in appropriate 
                                            
57  Basson and Viljoen Constitutional Law 58 ff; Booysen and Van Wyk '83 Grondwet 60 
ff; Carpenter Constitutional Law 174; Carpenter 1989 CILSA 190; Van der Vyver 
Grondwet 16 ff. 
58  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
59  The royal prerogative of pardoning or reprieving is a veto of judicial sentences and no 
longer compatible with a modern separation of powers. The overturning or amendment 
of the judgments of highly trained judges by a lay person cannot be legitimised in a 
constitutional state. It is not compatible with s 165(5) of the Constitution or the equal 
treatment clause in the bill of rights either. For a critical appraisal see Wolf 2011 PELJ 
59, 119-125. 
60  Subsections 85(2)(b) and (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereafter the Constitution) confers the power to develop policy and prepare and 
initiate legislation upon the executive. Section 44 confers similar powers upon the 
legislature.  
61  Section 87 of the Constitution. 
62  South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) 
(hereafter SA Association v Heath). 
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circumstances" the president may appoint a judicial officer to preside over 
a commission without infringing upon the separation of powers, but that will 
"depend on the subject matter of the inquiry":63 
The performance of such functions ordinarily calls for the qualities and skills 
required for the performance of judicial functions – independence, the 
weighing up of information, the forming of an opinion based on information, 
and the giving of a decision on the basis of a consideration of relevant 
information. 
The court warned, however, that the appointment of a judicial officer would 
be inappropriate where the judicial officer would be required to perform 
functions that were far removed from the judicial function.64 Judicial 
commissions of inquiry have a long tradition and generally enjoy a high 
standing because of their reputation for impartiality and non-partisanship. 
5.2.2 The SARFU judgment on the nature of section 84(2) powers 
In SARFU the Constitutional Court explained that the power to appoint 
commissions of inquiry under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution historically 
derived from the royal prerogatives that were exercised by the head of state 
under previous constitutions. The court held that both the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions make no mention of "prerogative powers", and accordingly the 
powers conferred upon the president by section 84(2) are limited to those 
listed.65 On this basis the court concluded that these powers are now 
"original" powers of the head of state derived from the Constitution and not 
from prerogatives.66 Whether one can maintain that the power to appoint 
commissions of inquiry is an "original" power of the head of state simply 
because it has not been called a prerogative power by section 84(2) is 
debateable. Sections 7(3) and (4) of the 1961 Constitution already 
transformed the prerogative powers into powers of the republican head of 
state.67 In terms of all the Constitutions since 1961 this power had the same 
content and was always exercised by the same office bearer. That hardly 
makes the power original. 
The court further held that the section 84(2) powers are "concerned with 
matters entrusted to the head of state" and noted that:68 
                                            
63  SA Association v Heath para 34. 
64  SA Association v Heath para 35. 
65  President v SARFU para 144. 
66  President v SARFU para 145. 
67  See n 60. 
68  President v SARFU para 145. 
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The exercise of some of these responsibilities is strictly controlled by express 
provisions of the Constitution. For example, the responsibility conferred by 
subsections 84(2)(a)-(c) concerning the assenting to and signature of Bills is 
regulated by section 79… These are very specifically controlled constitutional 
responsibilities directly related to the legislative process… Section 84(2)(d) 
and (e) which refer to the President's power to summon extraordinary sittings 
of parliament and his responsibility for making appointments required by the 
Constitution are similarly narrow constitutional responsibilities. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Court then came to the astounding conclusion that:69 
The remaining section 84(2) powers are discretionary powers conferred upon 
the President which are not constrained in any express manner by the 
provisions of the Constitution. Their scope is narrow: the conferral of honours; 
the appointment of ambassadors; the reception and recognition of foreign 
diplomatic representatives; the calling of referenda; the appointment of 
commissions of inquiry and the pardoning of offenders. They are closely 
related to policy; none of them is concerned with the implementation of 
legislation. Several of them are decisions which result in little or no further 
action by the government: the conferral of honours, the appointment of 
ambassadors or the reception of foreign diplomats, for example. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The court further elaborated that:70 
In the case of the appointment of commissions of inquiry, it is well-established 
that the functions of a commission of inquiry are to determine facts and to 
advise the President through the making of recommendations. … A 
commission of inquiry is an adjunct to the policy formation responsibility of the 
President. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court concluded that even if there are no explicit constraints to the 
section 84(2) responsibilities, they are nevertheless implicitly subject to the 
following constraints: the president (i) must exercise the powers personally, 
(ii) may not infringe any provisions of the bill of rights, (iii) must abide by the 
principle of legality; and (iv) must act in good faith and not misconstrue his 
powers. The latter statement implies that he may not exercise any of the 
responsibilities in a manner which is arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, or in 
furtherance of an ulterior or improper purpose; he may also not misconceive 
the nature of the powers.71 To summarise, the section 84(2) responsibilities 
of the head of state should be exercised in compliance with the Constitution 
and the law, and in a responsible and ethical manner.72  
                                            
69  President v SARFU para 146. 
70  President v SARFU paras 146-147. 
71  President v SARFU paras 148 and 225. 
72  Section 83(b) in conjunction with the oath of office of the president (Schedule 2, part 
1) requires that he should uphold and maintain the Constitution and all the laws and 
should discharge his duties true to the dictates of his conscience. 
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Two aspects of the cited passages are of interest insofar as they potentially 
affect the validity of the remedial action ordered by the public protector: first, 
the shaky foundation upon which the Court classified certain 
responsibilities, including the power to appoint commissions of inquiry, as 
discretionary in contrast to simply being a responsibility; and secondly, the 
ambivalence of the court's interpretation of the nature of the power to 
appoint commissions of inquiry and receive input by others. 
As seen above, the court classified the responsibilities under sections 
84(2)(f)–(k) as discretionary powers. Yet it is hard to justify that they are 
invariably or per se discretionary. The president cannot, for example, refuse 
to call a national referendum in terms of an Act of parliament because the 
Act impels him to do so.73 Likewise the president is bound to exercise his 
responsibilities in regard to receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic 
representatives and to appoint ambassadors, diplomatic and consular 
representatives to represent the country.74 It is not a discretionary power. 
Like in the case of appointments that he makes under subsection (e), he 
has the discretion about whom to appoint as diplomats, but must discharge 
the responsibility. The only two responsibilities that can be termed 
discretionary are those under subsections (j) and (k), ie pardoning and the 
conferral of honours. 
The fact that the exercise of the section 84(2) responsibilities is co-
influenced by other provisions does not say anything about the nature of the 
powers insofar as they are obligatory or discretionary. Sections 79 and 81, 
for example, make clear that the powers under subsections 84(2)(a)–(c) are 
obligatory. The president may not delay the promulgation of legislation by 
not signing and publishing legislation promptly after the legislature adopted 
a bill. By contrast, the summoning of the legislative bodies for special 
sittings is further elaborated upon by section 51(2), but this would appear to 
be a discretionary power. Likewise, some of the powers that are not further 
elaborated upon by other constitutional provisions can also be obligatory, 
eg the calling of a referendum in terms of an Act of parliament. It is also not 
convincing that appointments made under subsection (e) (eg appointments 
to the Chapter 9 institutions in terms of section 193(4) of the Constitution) 
are obligatory whereas appointments under subsection (i) are discretionary. 
To summarise: it would be more correct to say that the exercise of some of 
the section 84(2) responsibilities is co-influenced by other provisions of the 
                                            
73  Section 84(2)(g) of the Constitution. 
74  Section 84(2)(h) and (i) of the Constitution. 
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Constitution, but whether a power is obligatory or discretionary depends on 
the circumstances. 
It will be argued that the nature of the power to appoint commissions of 
inquiry is not necessarily a discretionary power and that the Constitutional 
Court might even have realised that in a later case. In the SARFU matter, 
the power was indeed exercised solely on a discretionary basis. The racial 
domination of rugby by one group was of concern to the president and thus 
he exercised the discretion to appoint a commission of inquiry into the 
administration of rugby in the country.75 
However, the matter of Crawford-Browne showed that there is potentially 
room for forcing the president to appoint a commission of inquiry. Two 
presidents were petitioned to appoint a commission of inquiry into alleged 
irregularities pertaining to the arms deal. It was argued that it is the head of 
state's responsibility to do so and the refusal to appoint a commission was 
challenged as irrational because he must discharge the responsibility in a 
manner which accords with the tenets of legality and rationality.76 From the 
directives requiring that written argument should be presented to the 
Constitutional Court addressing the issue of whether section 84(2)(f) of the 
Constitution obliges the president to exercise his power to appoint a 
commission of inquiry "whenever there are indications of corruption and 
misfeasance in relation to public procurement", and if not, in what 
circumstances indications of corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance 
would oblige the president to appoint a commission of inquiry bear 
testimony to the fact that the Constitutional Court saw a need to address the 
issue of whether or under what circumstances commissions of inquiry into 
executive malfeasance and an abuse of power would be appropriate.77 
One can make a strong case that the president does not have a discretion 
whether or not to appoint a commission of inquiry if he is required to do so 
                                            
75  President v SARFU para 2. 
76  Crawford-Browne v President of the Republic of South Africa (WC) (unreported) case 
number 1135/09. Zuma's counsel filed a number of exceptions, inter alia that only the 
Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to decide the matter. Crawford-Browne then 
filed an application to the Constitutional Court to grant the same relief he claimed in 
the action by way of a declaratory mandamus aimed at securing the appointment of 
an independent judicial inquiry into the arms deal: Crawford-Browne v The President 
of the Republic of South Africa (CC) (unreported) case number CCT 103/10 (settled 
out of court). Before the case could be heard in September 2011, President Zuma 
reached a last minute out-of-court settlement with Crawford-Browne. See Hoffman 
Confronting the Corrupt 53-62. 
77  Crawford-Browne v The President of South Africa (CC) (unreported) case number 
CCT 103/10; directions of the Chief Justice issued on 7 February 2011 (settled out of 
court). 
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by the public protector in terms of the powers under section 182(1)(c). This 
is no different from the situation where the president is required to assent to 
and promulgate legislation adopted by parliament or to call a referendum if 
an Act of Parliament requires him to do so. These state organs act in terms 
of constitutional powers conferred upon them, which makes it obligatory that 
he takes specific action when required to do so because it is his 
responsibility to perform these tasks. 
I now move to the second aspect, viz the ambivalence of the court's 
explanation of the nature of the section 84(2) responsibilities, because it 
does not clearly delineate these responsibilities from executive powers. On 
the one hand, the court reasoned that none of the section 84(2) 
responsibilities "is concerned with the implementation of legislation". The 
implementation of legislation is a function allocated to the executive by 
section 85(2)(a) of the Constitution.78 One can therefore only agree with the 
court that the exercise of these responsibilities cannot involve administrative 
action.79 In fact, none of the section 84(2) responsibilities can be classified 
as administrative action.80 Yet the court also regards it as part of the powers 
of the head of state to formulate policy on the basis of recommendations 
made by a commission of inquiry. That, however, is a power of the executive 
branch in terms of section 85(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
The ambivalence is further underscored by the fact that the court noted that 
several of the decisions taken in terms of subsections 84(2)(f)–(k) "result in 
little or no further action by the government", which implies that the cabinet 
can actually be involved in taking these decisions to a certain extent. What 
                                            
78  President v SARFU para 145. 
79  President v SARFU paras 34, 127–128. Strangely, the Court did not find it necessary 
to decide whether the decision to make the Commissions Act applicable to an inquiry 
should be classified as administrative action. The views expressed by the court (eg in 
paras 141 and 148) are rather confusing. The confusion stems partly from the fact that 
the court associates administrative action with the exercise of a "public duty" of the 
"public administration". In fact, all state institutions, including the judiciary, prosecutors 
and the legislature, exercise public powers. The definitive characteristic of 
administrative action is that it specifically concerns the exercise of executive power. 
In contrast to other executive powers (eg internal executive action, disciplinary 
measures, the issuing of regulations, etc) administrative action is taken in relation to 
a natural or legal person in a vertical power relation. In casu, the appointment of a 
commission of inquiry by the president is a horizontal power relation: two state organs 
are involved – the president and the commission of inquiry. 
80  An administrative act is a measure taken by an executive state organ or authority 
which has regulating character in the individual instance, and the communication of 
the measure creates a direct, external effect that establishes its legal enforceability in 
terms of administrative law. It concerns measures such as the issuing of licences, 
permits, notices, etc in a vertical power relation in the sphere of executive state 
administration. 
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should one then make of the Court's statement that section 84(2)(f) confers 
the power to appoint commissions of inquiry "upon the president alone"?81 
The court reasoned that it would amount to an "abdication of power" if the 
President should delegate the power to appoint a commission of inquiry to 
another state organ or person.82 It therefore appears that what the court 
meant was that the president cannot delegate his functions of office to 
another state official. The court was careful not to preclude that the 
president may consult with cabinet ministers or take advice from other 
advisors in the exercise of the head of state responsibilities, provided it is 
the president who finally exercises the power.83 The court found that it need 
not precisely determine what would constitute such an abdication of the 
power, but in reliance on Baxter's Administrative Law,84 indicated that it 
could be any of the following: an unlawful delegation of the power; when 
acting on the instructions of another person; or "passing the buck".85 
One should be careful, however, to apply rules of administrative law directly 
to other constitutional powers. The head of state obviously cannot delegate 
his powers to another state organ, whereas this is possible in executive 
state administration. Section 90 of the Constitution provides for substitutes 
in an acting capacity when the president is absent from the country or 
otherwise unable to fulfil the duties of President, but not for a delegation of 
power.86 The prompting to exercise some of these responsibilities by 
another state organ also cannot be equated with an unlawful "instruction". 
It is not clear what the court envisaged under "passing the buck" in relation 
to the exercise of these powers. Usually it means to blame someone or 
make others responsible for a problem that you should deal with. 
5.3 The "unfettered discretion" and a conflict of interests 
The difficulty is that the head of state (President Zuma) is required to appoint 
a commission of inquiry into alleged improper or corrupt behaviour of the 
head of government (also President Zuma) on the basis of prima facie 
evidence presented to the public protector. He allegedly abdicated 
executive powers to the Gupta family with regard to cabinet and other 
                                            
81  President v SARFU para 38. 
82  President v SARFU para 38. 
83  President v SARFU paras 40-44. 
84  Baxter Administrative Law 434-444. 
85  President v SARFU paras 39-40. 
86  Section 90(1)(a)-(d) of the Constitution prescribes the order of the office-bearers that 
should take over such functions: first the deputy president, then a minister designated 
by the president, thereafter a minister designated by the other cabinet ministers, and 
finally the speaker of the National Assembly. 
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appointments and allegedly acted in a manner which is inconsistent with 
sections 91 and 96 of the Constitution as well as the Executive Members' 
Ethics Act in exchange for financial benefits for his family. 
In the State of Capture report, the public protector noted that President 
Zuma conceded that he could not be "judge and jury" in his own case in 
regard to the Nkandla upgrades.87 However, in contrast to the view that he 
finally came to endorse in the Nkandla matter, the president has taken the 
stance in the "state capture" matter that he has an unfettered discretion to 
appoint commissions of inquiry when it suits him and that it falls in his 
exclusive discretion to determine the terms of reference.88 
The first misconception is that he has an unfettered discretion to appoint 
commissions of inquiry. In SARFU the Constitutional Court explicitly ruled 
that the power is implicitly constrained by the rule of law: decisions may not 
be taken in furtherance of an ulterior or improper purpose.89 Secondly, given 
the fact that the remedial action involves an inquiry into alleged improper 
behaviour of the president, the conflict of interest would certainly require a 
reasonable limitation of his powers to preclude a potential undue 
manipulation of the inquiry. Madonsela tried to avoid these difficulties by 
limiting the president's power to appoint the commission of inquiry insofar 
as he should not be allowed to select a judge of his choice or to frame 
specific terms of reference for the investigation on the basis of the nemo 
iudex maxim. 
5.3.1 The nemo iudex maxim 
The maxim nemo iudex in sua causa is a common law principle associated 
with procedural fairness and is often described as the rule against bias. In 
De Lange v Smuts Mokgoro J observed that: 90 
[At] heart, fair procedure is designed to prevent arbitrariness in the outcome 
of the decision. The time-honoured [principle] that no-one shall be the judge 
in his or her own matter … [aims] toward eliminating the proscribed 
arbitrariness in a way that gives content to the rule of law. 
The nemo iudex maxim applies not only to the administration of justice 
involving decisions taken by prosecutors and judges, but extends to a 
variety of less obvious forms of impartiality to secure good administration. 
                                            
87  State of Capture Report 24-25, 353. 
88  Presidency 2017 http://www.psppd.org.za/press-statements/president-zuma-not-
opposed-establishing-commission-inquiry-%E2%80%9Cstate-capture%E2%80%9D. 
89 See n 71. 
90  De Lange v Smuts 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) para 131 (minority judgment). 
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Decisions are more likely to be sound when the decision-maker is unbiased 
and the public will have more faith in a process when justice is not only done 
but is seen to be done. Decision-makers must therefore be prevented from 
making decisions that are based on illegitimate (often personal) motives and 
considerations. The sources of bias could include that the body or person 
taking the decision has a financial interest or a personal interest in the 
matter. It could also involve bias on the subject matter or "official" or 
institutional bias. The maxim finds application essentially in judicial and 
quasi-judicial contexts, epitomised respectively by the judicial trial and 
proceedings of disciplinary and other tribunals.91 It will certainly also apply 
to the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry.92 
5.3.2. Credibility of the inquiry 
Dube supports the contention that there are reasonable limitations to the 
presidential power to appoint a commission of inquiry when it is in the public 
interest. By necessary implication it is important that the commission should 
have absolute credibility and therefore not even a whiff of partiality. Thus, 
the public interest should outweigh the presidential discretion to determine 
who should conduct the inquiry.93 
De Vos noted that the remedial action required by the public protector fetters 
the discretion of the president to appoint commissions of inquiry. Yet in 
these extraordinary circumstances in which the president is being implicated 
in breaches of the Executive Members' Ethics Act and in possible 
corruption, there are excellent reasons why the president should not have 
the discretion to appoint a judge of his choice to head a commission of 
inquiry to investigate matters delineated by the president. The president is 
conflicted as he is implicated in wrongdoing which would have to be 
investigated by the commission of inquiry. It is inevitable that if his discretion 
is not fettered he would appoint a judge he perceives to be sympathetic to 
him. This conflict of interest would almost certainly invalidate the entire 
commission.94 
                                            
91  Hoexter Administrative Law 405-412. 
92  Hoexter Administrative Law 405 notes that in other settings allegations of what might 
sound like bias are more likely to be couched in the language of "abuse of discretion": 
an administrator will be accused of pursuing ulterior purposes or taking irrelevant 
considerations into account rather than of being biased. 
93  Dube 2016 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/did-the-state-of-capture-
report-usurp-the-presiden. 
94  De Vos 2016 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-11-03-can-zuma-use-
the-law-to-avoid-the-consequences-of-madonselas-report/#.WVHwPOlpzyQ. 
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There is indeed a high risk that the credibility and impartiality of the inquiry 
would be compromised if the president could select a judge of his choice to 
conduct the inquiry. The Seriti commission of inquiry is a case in point. It 
raised serious concerns insofar as President Zuma was compromised by 
the topic of the inquiry but had the scope to select the commissioners and 
could influence the inquiry in other ways. Zuma took the decision to appoint 
the commission of inquiry into the arms deal only after his lawyers had a 
quiet word with him to say that they had a rather difficult case to answer in 
the Constitutional Court and stood every chance of losing it. Rather than 
having the courts dictate how the investigation should happen, the president 
moved first and kept its scope and depth within his control by announcing it 
himself. 
It is difficult to deny that Zuma hand-picked the judges to conduct the inquiry, 
at least two of whom he perceived to be potentially sympathetic to him. He 
appointed Supreme Court of Appeal Judge Willie Seriti as chair of the 
commission. Deputy Judge President of the High Court of Pretoria, Willem 
van der Merwe and Judge Francis Legodi of the same court were to co-
chair the inquiry. Justice van der Merwe presided over Zuma's rape trial in 
2006, where Zuma was acquitted, and immediately recused himself due to 
the obvious implications for his impartiality. Justice Seriti was apparently the 
judge who authorised the tapping of the telephone conversations which 
produced the so-called "spy tapes" that were leaked to Zuma and which he 
used to pressurise the prosecuting authority to drop 783 charges of 
corruption and fraud against him in 2009. Zuma was inter alia accused of 
having solicited a bribe in the range of R500,000 a year from a French arms 
company in exchange for favours in the arms procurement proceedings. 
Unlike van der Merwe, Seriti did not recuse himself.95 
According to reports, Seriti ruled the commission with an iron fist, and facts 
were manipulated or withheld from commissioners. Justice Legodi withdrew 
and several investigators resigned in protest about the manner in which the 
inquiry was conducted.96 The commission was criticised for the incorrect 
                                            
95  Rabkin Business Day 5; Underhill 2012 https://mg.co.za/article/2012-10-19-00-arms-
deal-twist-raises-alarm. 
96  In August 2014 advocates Skinner SC and Sibiya resigned as investigators because 
Justice Seriti denied them the right to re-examine witnesses, even though it was a 
crucial part of their job. Vital documentary evidence was withheld from them. The two 
advocates joined a growing list of senior legal figures who quit the commission in the 
18 months before and who expressed disquiet in public or to their colleagues about 
the clandestine way in which the commission was being conducted. They include 
senior investigator and attorney Moabi, principal legal researcher attorney Painting, 
and evidence leader Aboobaker. The resignations snowballed after Moabi claimed in 
his resignation letter that the commission had a "second agenda". Those who left 
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handling of witnesses and the exclusion of important documentation. A 
lawyer who was engaged as a consultant for the French arms dealer Thales 
offered evidence that Thales donated €1 million to the ANC as a kickback 
after it was awarded a R2,6 billion contract in 1997. He was also willing to 
testify that Zuma received hundreds of thousands of rands from the arms 
company during the time when he was deputy president, that the company 
invited Zuma to the Rugby World Cup semi-final in Paris and paid for his 
stays in luxury hotels in Paris and Brussels, bought him expensive designer 
clothes and gave him €25.000 spending money during the trip. Zuma 
allegedly tried to silence the lawyer by asking him not to testify before the 
commission. The lawyer nevertheless approached the commission twice 
and offered to testify, but never received a response.97 
Upon making the report public Zuma expressed his "sincere gratitude and 
appreciation" to Seriti for his findings that "not a single iota of evidence was 
placed before it" showing that bribes had been paid to consultants, public 
officials or members of cabinet.98 The findings of the commission, which 
were widely perceived to be partial and a whitewash designed to acquit the 
government of any wrongdoing, have been challenged by Corruption Watch 
and the Right2Know Campaign.99 Zuma's interference with a key witness 
shows that the arms deal inquiry was tainted from the very beginning. One 
may rightly wonder whether there was not also undue influence on the 
chairperson of the commission, as in the Hlophe affair.100 The way in which 
the inquiry was conducted definitely stands in stark contrast to the way in 
which other judicial inquiries have been conducted. 
Another inquiry illustrates the dilemma where a president in an executive 
capacity is personally involved in events that form the topic of an inquiry and 
                                            
claimed this was to protect members of the ANC, including President Zuma, from 
being implicated. See Underhill 2013 https://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-02-arms-deal-
commission-lawyer-resigned-over-second-agenda; Underhill 2014 https://mg.co.za/ 
article/2014-08-11-resignations-take-arms-deal-probe-from-mess-to-farce. 
97  Grootes 2017 http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/02/arms-deal-critics-welcome-ajay-sooklal-
affidavit-into-zuma-s-concealed-role. 
98  Seriti 2015 http://www.gov.za/documents/arms-procurement-commission-report-21-
apr-2016-0000 (Seriti Report); Thamm 2016 https://www.dailymaverick. 
co.za/article/2016-04-21-seriti-commission-findings-on-arms-deal-it-aint-over-till-
concourt-sings/#.WVUAyOlpzyQ. 
99  Jamal 2016 https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2016-04-22-seriti-
commission-of-inquiry-whitewash---findings-are-a-joke-critics/; Hoffman Confronting 
the Corrupt 63-94; Grootes 2017 http://ewn.co.za/2017/05/02/arms-deal-critics-
welcome-ajay-sooklal-affidavit-into-zuma-s-concealed-role. 
100  In May 2008, judges of the Constitutional Court accused the Western Cape Judge 
President John Hlope of improper behaviour because he tried to influence a number 
of them in favour of Zuma in the Thint/Thales matter. 
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uses the power of the head of state to manipulate the proceedings in his 
favour. In September 2007 Advocate Pikoli, national director of the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA), crossed swords with former President Mbeki 
over the prosecution of the erstwhile Police Commissioner Selebi on 
charges of corruption. On the pretext that it was a matter of "national 
security" and that the president (in an executive capacity) has the final say 
in the matter, he suspended Pikoli from office.101 The president appointed 
the Ginwala commission of inquiry into Pikoli's fitness to hold office. The 
inquiry was conducted in terms of section 12(6) of the National Prosecuting 
Authority Act 32 of 1998 and not the Commissions Act, but the president's 
power to appoint such a commission arguably derives from section 84(2)(f) 
of the Constitution. 
The impartiality of Dr Ginwala, a former speaker and a close confidante of 
the president, was questioned at her appointment. She was spotted on a 
flight in the company of the justice minister a few days before Pikoli was 
suspended, but the justice minister refused to answer questions in this 
regard in parliament.102 It was suspected that the president had appointed 
a person to conduct the inquiry who was favourably disposed towards him. 
As could be expected, Ginwala did not make any adverse findings about the 
legality of the president's suspension of Pikoli to save his friend from being 
prosecuted.103 Even though the president and the justice minister were 
precluded from interfering with criminal prosecutions,104 they were not even 
called to appear before the commission to give evidence about the role they 
had played in Pikoli's illegal suspension from office. The terms of reference 
also precluded such an investigation. This shows how the president, acting 
as head of state, can manipulate an inquiry to sweep under the carpet its 
own abuse of power in an executive capacity. 
The constitutionality of section 12(6) of the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act is highly questionable.105 In the Pikoli matter there was actually a dispute 
                                            
101  Letter of former President Mbeki to Adv Vusi Pikoli dated 23 September 2007 
suspending him from office. See Trengove, Bruinders and Makola 2008 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/replies/the-real-reason-for-pikolis-suspension. On 
undue executive interference in criminal prosecutions, see n 35. 
102  The fact that the justice minister and Ginwala had travelled together was meaningful 
insofar as the minister might have influenced her. If they had had meetings before the 
commission was appointed, the independence of the inquiry was still-born. See Spies 
2007 http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/special_items/statements/not_recall.html. 
103  Ginwala 2008 http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/2008_ginwala.pdf (Ginwala 
Report). 
104  Section 31(1)(b) of the Prosecuting Authority Act. 
105  If there is a dispute between state organs about the status or the nature and scope of 
its powers, this falls in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court (s 167(4) 
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about the demarcation of the powers of two state organs, and that falls in 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in terms of section 
167(4) of the Constitution. A commission of inquiry into the national 
director's fitness to hold office cannot be used to settle such a dispute. 
Grant observed that Zuma dodged the arms deal debacle and is seemingly 
using the same tactic now to control the framework of the "state capture" 
inquiry.106 Should he appoint a commission of inquiry into state capture 
there would be a considerable risk that he would find himself, as well as 
members of his immediate family, exposed to potential civil and criminal 
liability for their alleged participation in the capture of the state. In the light 
thereof, there is a very high risk that the "state capture" inquiry could be 
manipulated in the same way as the arms deal inquiry was. 
5.3.3 Limitation of the power to appointment a commission of inquiry 
In terms of the nemo iudex rule the president should be barred from taking 
any decisions in this regard due to his personal involvement and the 
financial interests of his family and friends that are at stake. There are two 
possible ways in which this difficulty could be resolved, but only one is 
constitutionally viable. The first is the option chosen by the public protector, 
viz that the chief justice should present the president with the name of a 
particular judge to conduct the inquiry and that some terms of reference are 
predetermined to avoid a manipulation of the inquiry. The second option is 
that one of the state officials listed to perform the responsibilities of the head 
of state in an acting capacity should appoint the commission of inquiry. 
5.3.3.1 How should the commissioner be selected? 
The first option does not entail a delegation of power to the chief justice 
because he is not formally required to take the decision to appoint the 
commission of inquiry. It is a measure which is intended to avoid a biased 
decision. Due to the high regard for the impartiality of the judiciary, it is 
                                            
of the Constitution). It is not for the president as the head of state to decide whether 
or not the director of public prosecutions is fit to hold office. This can be decided only 
in terms of legal norms, as illustrated by Simelane's case in Democratic Alliance v 
President of South Africa 2013 1 SA 248 (CC). The mechanism of a commission of 
inquiry has been abused to get rid of directors of the prosecuting authority when they 
do not dance to the tune of the executive – see Wolf 2015 Administratio Publica 44-
47. Even though the Ginwala inquiry found that Pikoli was fit to hold office, both Mbeki 
and Mothlante refused to reinstate him in office. 
106  Views expressed in an interview with Umraw 2017 http://www.huffingtonpost. 
co.za/2017/05/29/heres-how-zuma-will-ensure-a-judicial-inquiry-into-state-
captur_a_22115149/. 
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understandable that the public protector determined that the commission 
should be headed by a judge selected on the advice of the chief justice. The 
chief justice seems to be the obvious choice, since he is a non-partisan 
outsider, knows his colleagues, and could determine their availability. 
Viewed from this perspective, the chief justice can be regarded as an 
appropriate person to select a judge to ensure the non-partisanship and 
credibility of the inquiry. In terms of the remedial action, the chief justice 
would not be involved in anything except to advise the president about a 
suitable judge to conduct the inquiry. Chief Justice Moegoeng Moegoeng 
has indicated that he will not become active in the matter unless he is 
approached by the president.107 
A careful reading of the SARFU judgment has showed that the 
Constitutional Court has not precluded such advice, as long as the president 
formally exercises the section 84(2) responsibilities. Such advice therefore 
cannot be construed as an unconstitutional delegation of power. This aspect 
of the remedial action therefore seems to be in order. Interestingly, a House 
of Commons report on commissions of inquiry in the UK addressed the 
dilemma of such a conflict of interest and recommended that the chief 
justice should be equally involved in all decisions about the use of judges in 
inquiries.108 
The second option is that the president should recuse himself from any 
involvement in appointing such a commission of inquiry and leave it to the 
deputy president to comply with the remedial action. A number of lobby 
groups have approached the Constitutional Court to ask deputy president 
                                            
107  Madia 2016 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/chief-justice-will-wait-to-hear-
from-zuma-on-state-capture-inquiry-20161117. 
108  House of Commons Government by Inquiry 3, 19-26. The inquiry considered the 
political and constitutional implications of the frequent use of judges to head inquiries, 
especially the impact on judges' independence and reputation for political neutrality. 
About 30% of executive departmental inquiries or statutory inquiries appointed by a 
minister (ie excluding the royal commissions) were chaired by a judge in the 20th 
century. Many of these inquiries took on a quasi-judicial nature, and although the skills 
and impartiality of judges could benefit such inquiries, this practice also has a negative 
effect in that the judiciary is consequently short of personnel for long periods. The 
reputation of judges could also be tarnished by their engagement in politically sensitive 
inquiries: If their reports fail to conclude that ministers or senior officials abused their 
powers, the reports may be characterised as a "whitewash" by political opponents; if 
their findings blame ministers they may be criticised for interfering in politics. There is 
a real danger that a judge who chaired a politically controversial inquiry will be 
perceived differently by sections of the public when he returns to his judicial role. The 
report recommended that the chief justice "should be equally involved with Ministers 
in all decisions about the use of judges in inquiries". 
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Ramaphosa to set up the commission of inquiry in an acting capacity in 
terms of section 90(1)(a) of the Constitution.109 
The difficulty with this option is that another state official can take over the 
functions of the president in an acting capacity only within the limited scope 
specified by section 90(1) of the Constitution, ie when the president is 
absent from the country or "otherwise unable to fulfil the duties of President" 
(eg when he is seriously ill for a long period or falls into a coma), or during 
a vacancy. The provision requires that the substitute should perform the 
functions of the president for a specific period, namely for the duration of 
the absence of the president from the country, for the duration of his 
incapacity, or for the duration of a vacancy. Subsections (a) to (d) determine 
a ranking order of officials that may perform the functions of the head of 
state in an acting capacity: first the deputy president, then a minister 
designated by the president, thereafter a minister designated by the other 
members of the cabinet, and finally the speaker of parliament. Sections 
90(2) and (4) also make clear that the person takes over all the functions in 
an acting capacity "during the period". Before the acting president can take 
over the responsibilities, powers and functions of the president, he must 
swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the 
Constitution.110 In casu, none of the section 90(1) instances are applicable. 
Section 90 does not contemplate the taking over of a specific task of the 
president in an acting capacity on an ad hoc basis. 
The Constitution does not offer any guidelines as to what should happen 
when the president is faced by a conflict of interests and must recuse 
himself from taking specific decisions. If a cabinet minister would recuse 
him- or herself from taking specific decisions due to a conflict of interest, a 
deputy minister or other official with the requisite power could step in and 
take the decision. The deputy president, however, is a member of the 
cabinet but not the deputy head of state.111 It would amount to an 
unconstitutional delegation of a power if the deputy president should 
exercise powers on behalf of the head of state on an ad hoc basis. 
                                            
109  Thamm 2017 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-06-11-state-capture-
lobby-groups-approach-concourt-to-ask-ramaphosa-to-set-up-commission-of-
inquiry/#.WVUaUelpzyQ. Ramaphosa called for a judicial commission of inquiry twice 
before President Zuma issued the press statement in May 2017, but did not give any 
indication of how this should be instituted. See Goba 2017 https://www.timeslive. 
co.za/politics/2017-05-30-state-capture-is-busy-eating-the-anc-away-ramaphosa; 
ANA Reporter 2017 http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ramaphosa-renews-call-for-
state-capture-inquiry-9257815. 
110  Section 90(3) of the Constitution. 
111  Section 91(1) and (2) and s 92(1) of the Constitution. 
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In a serious matter such as "state capture", parliament could of course pass 
a motion of no confidence or remove the president from office. This would 
create a vacancy that would enable the deputy president to take the relevant 
action in an acting capacity. This has not happened, though. In fact, the 
Cabinet and the ANC in parliament went to great lengths to protect Zuma 
from the report's implications.112 
If the deputy president were to appoint a commission of inquiry, this would 
also not solve the problem of institutional bias or bias regarding the subject 
matter of the inquiry.113 After President Zuma issued the press statement 
on 26 May 2017 that he was not opposed to appointing a "state capture" 
inquiry, the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) endorsed his 
proposal to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry on his own terms.114 
The dilemma is therefore that all four ANC substitutes for the president in 
an acting capacity are bound by this decision and would be tainted by bias 
in his favour. 
Apart from that, all cabinet members are appointees of President Zuma. 
Should the Constitutional Court therefore rule that Deputy President 
Ramaphosa should execute the remedial action on his behalf as he is not 
implicated in the matter, there is nothing that would prevent Zuma from 
dismissing Ramaphosa from office in order to retain his grip on the terms of 
reference. He could then handpick one of his "trusted ministers" to appoint 
an inquiry according to his liking. 
5.3.3.2 The terms of reference of the commission of inquiry 
A commission of inquiry is usually appointed by way of proclamation in the 
Government Gazette and contains particulars about the terms of reference. 
The terms of reference constitute a mandate for the commissioner which he 
uses to determine the scope of the commission's investigation. It must be 
reasonably comprehensive so that the commission or interested parties can 
determine the nature and ambit of the commission's mandate with 
reasonable certainty. The terms of reference are issued independently of 
                                            
112  Subsequent to the release of the State of Capture Report, a motion of no confidence 
in the president was rejected by the ANC majority in parliament – Nicholson 2016 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-11-10-no-confidence-anc-wins-the-
vote-but-zuma-suffers-in-battle/#.WVUhVulpzyQ. 
113  Institutional bias refers to officers taking a decision for an inquiry in which they officially 
have a stake. See Hoexter Administrative Law 411-412. 
114  Bendile 2017 https://mg.co.za/article/2017-05-29-anc-calls-for-judicial-commission-
of-inquiry-into-state-capture. 
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the Commissions Act.115 The Commissions Act is not automatically 
applicable to all commissions of inquiry. The power to make the 
Commissions Act applicable to a commission is conferred by legislation.116 
The legislation gives important and potentially invasive powers to a 
commission in order to ensure that it is able to perform its task effectively. 
The State of Capture report determines that the judge chairing the 
commission should investigate all the issues pertaining to "state capture", 
using the record of the public protector's investigation and the report as a 
starting point. It further appears that the public protector intended that the 
commission of inquiry should also be given powers of evidence in terms of 
the Commissions Act. She required that the powers of evidence should be 
"no less than that of the public protector".117 Section 3 of the Commissions 
Act determines that for the purpose of ascertaining any matter relating to 
the subject of investigations, a commissioner shall have the powers of a 
High Court to summon witnesses, to lead evidence under oath and to 
require the production of documents to the inquiry. These powers are similar 
to the powers conferred upon the public protector in terms of section 7 of 
the Public Protector Act. There would be little sense in conducting the 
inquiry without such powers of evidence. Apart from that, the judge should 
be able to appoint his/her own staff and must complete the inquiry and 
present the report with findings and recommendations to the president 
within 180 days. Once the report is presented to the president, he should 
submit a copy to parliament within 14 days of its release and inform 
parliament about his intentions regarding the implementation of the 
recommendations.118 The framework of the inquiry is therefore part of the 
remedial action. 
Zuma's stance is that the remedial action infringes upon the scope and 
ambit of his powers as head of state. He objects to the public protector's 
instructing him what type of commission to appoint, what the subject matter 
of the inquiry should be, what the timeline for establishing the commission 
(ie within 30 days after the publication of the report) should be, what its 
terms of reference and the duration to conduct the inquiry should be, and 
what the time span within which Zuma should submit the report to 
                                            
115  Freedman "Commissions" 157. The provisions of the Commissions Act do not refer to 
the terms of reference of a commission.  
116  Section 1 of the Commissions Act. See President v SARFU paras 126, 130-131, 154, 
163. 
117  State of Capture Report 354. 
118  State of Capture Report 354. 
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parliament and inform parliament about his intentions regarding the 
implementation of the recommendations should be.119 
In contrast to his reaction to the remedial action ordered by the public 
protector, President Zuma strangely did not object to a member of the 
executive branch (the justice minister) framing and issuing the terms for the 
Seriti commission. This most probably amounted to an unconstitutional 
delegation of power. Radebe framed the terms in a quest "to rid our nation" 
of what has become "an albatross that must now cease to blemish the 
reputation of our government".120 He dramatically added: 
As we cross the Arms Deal Rubicon, we wish to assure all South Africans that 
this Commission will work independently of everyone, including the Executive. 
Its credibility remains paramount as it is about to undertake an all-important 
national duty. The impact of its work will be significant even beyond the 
borders of our shores. … Every time an end appeared in sight, new allegations 
would emerge. It is our conviction that the Inquiry will enable us collectively as 
a nation to reach closure on this otherwise contentious matter. 
The reason why Madonsela formulated the instructions in the State of 
Capture report in a particularly detailed way might also have to do with past 
experiences. It was not the first time that Madonsela had had to investigate 
the gross abuse of power by the president, and she had ample experience 
of his tendency to use loopholes to buy time, postpone, delay, defer, defuse 
and deny issues.121 
This tendency is also apparent in the arms deal inquiry. Two years expired 
between Zuma's reaching an out-of-court settlement with Crawford-Browne 
and appointing the commission. Initially the inquiry had to be completed 
within two years from the date when the terms of reference were issued (27 
October 2011), with an additional period of six months to complete the final 
report. This gave Zuma ample time to canvass for his re-election without 
any blemishes at the 2012 ANC national conference. The inquiry was further 
dragged out, with the report finally being submitted to the president on 30 
December 2015. Zuma released it in April 2016, ie six-and-a-half years after 
he agreed to appoint the commission.122 If it should take as long to complete 
the inquiry into "state capture", Zuma will no longer be in office and would 
                                            
119  Presidency 2017 http://www.psppd.org.za/press-statements/president-zuma-not-
opposed-establishing-commission-inquiry-%E2%80%9Cstate-capture%E2%80%9D. 
120  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 http://www.justice. 
gov.za/m_statements/2011/20111027_armscomms.html. 
121  See n 7. 
122  Thamm 2016 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-21-seriti-commission-
findings-on-arms-deal-it-aint-over-till-concourt-sings/#.WVUAyOlpzyQ. 
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probably be enjoying the fruits of state capture in the luxury mansion the 
Guptas bought for him in Dubai. 
It was also to be anticipated that Zuma would try to fiddle with the topic and 
scope of the inquiry. And so it happened. After the ANC's NEC committee 
endorsed his proposals, the body insisted that the inquiry should be 
expanded to uncover the general influence of business on the state since 
1994.123 This is clearly an attempt to overburden the commission and to 
undercut the purpose of the remedial action. If the president should be 
allowed to tamper with the remedial action in that he could change the topic 
of the inquiry, this would give rise to bias in the subject matter.124 
6 Conclusions 
In terms of the remedial action in the State of Capture report, the president 
is required to appoint a commission of inquiry into the capture of state 
institutions by the Gupta family, who used their connections to him to 
manipulate cabinet and other appointments and to enrich themselves 
through tainted state procurement. President Zuma has launched an action 
to set aside the remedial action and to refer the investigation back to 
Madonsela's successor. He argues that it is the sole prerogative of the head 
of state under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution to appoint commissions of 
inquiry. However, in the matter of the Economic Freedom Fighters the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the public protector's power to take 
appropriate remedial action under section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution is 
legally binding and must be executed by the state organs concerned. 
Since the president and his family are implicated in allegations of corruption 
and undue enrichment, the public protector has limited his choice of a 
commissioner to conduct the inquiry and his power to determine the terms 
of reference to some extent, to avoid a biased outcome. She also set a time 
frame for the inquiry to be conducted to bring it to finality in good time for 
the recommendations to be implemented timeously. 
It has been shown that like other section 84(2) powers the responsibility of 
the head of state to appoint commissions of inquiry is not invariably a 
discretionary power and could also be triggered by another state organ. It is 
                                            
123  Umraw 2017 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/05/29/heres-how-zuma-will-
ensure-a-judicial-inquiry-into-state-captur_a_22115149/. 
124  For a discussion of this aspect of the nemo iudex maxim, see Hoexter Administrative 
Law 409-411. 
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also not an unfettered discretion: the Constitutional Court clearly spelt out 
implicit limits to the power in SARFU. 
In terms of the nemo iudex maxim the president would be barred from taking 
any decisions relating to a commission of inquiry into his own wrongdoing 
and ought to recuse himself. The difficulty is that he cannot delegate this 
power to another person on an ad hoc basis. Section 90 provides that 
another state official can take over all the functions of the head of state only 
for the duration of the president's absence from the country or for the 
duration of his incapacity to fulfil the duties of office. It would therefore 
amount to an unconstitutional delegation of power if the deputy president 
should appoint a commission of inquiry on his behalf. 
In SARFU the Constitutional Court indicated that advice to the president by 
another state organ is allowed as long as he formally takes the decision to 
appoint the commission of inquiry. The instruction of the public protector 
that the chief justice should advise the president on which judge to appoint 
as the commissioner probably cannot be faulted. 
In terms of the nemo iudex maxim a reasonable limitation of the terms of 
reference would also be necessary to avoid a manipulation of the inquiry. 
This aspect of the remedial action therefore also appears to be in order. 
The powers of the public protector to investigate executive malfeasance and 
malpractices do not exclude a more extensive investigation by a judicial 
commission of inquiry. In casu two factors played a role in the former public 
protector's deciding to refer the investigation to a commission of inquiry: the 
first is that insufficient funds had been made available to her office by the 
executive to conduct the inquiry, and the second is that during the 
investigation it became clear that the sheer scope of the investigation would 
actually require a commission of inquiry that could conduct a full-scale 
inquiry. It is not for the president to decide what form the remedial action 
would be more appropriate under the circumstances. 
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